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Bell Measurement and Local Measurement in the Modified Lo-Chau Quantum Key
Distribution Protocol
Won-Young Hwang∗
Department of Physics Education, Chonnam National University, Kwangjoo 500-757, Republic of Korea
We clarify the argument on the how (nonlocal) degenerate Bell measurement can be replaced
by local measurements in the modified Lo-Chau quantum key distribution protocol. Discussing
security criterion for users, we describe how eavesdropper’s refined information on the final state
is not helpful. We argue that current discussions on the equivalence of the Bell and the local
measurements are not clear. We show how the problem of equivalence can be resolved using the
fact that eavesdropper’s refined information is not helpful for her.
PACS: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography, more precisely, quantum key
distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12], is one
of the most promising protocols in quantum information
processing [11]. Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD
protocol [1] had been widely conjectured to be secure
based on the quantum no-cloning theorem [13, 14, 15]
before its security was shown by a few authors recently
[2, 3, 4]. However, Refs. 2 and 3 seem to be too compli-
cated to be widely understood while Ref. 4 is relatively
simple in that it makes use of tools that are familiar to
quantum information scientist, e.g. quantum error cor-
recting code (QECC) and entanglement distillation pro-
tocol (EDP). Thus, the approach of Shor and Preskill [4]
is being more widely accepted and applied to deal with
the security of variations of the BB 84 protocols [9, 12].
In Ref. 4, the authors argue that the modified Lo-
Chau (LC) protocol based on the EDP is secure. Then,
they show that the modified LC protocol reduces to the
BB84 protocol. Thus, the security of the BB84 proto-
col depends on that of the modified LC protocol. In the
discussion on security of the modified LC protocol, they
use ‘classicalization of statistics’ (or ‘quantum to classi-
cal reduction’) [5, 6]. However, in the derivation of the
classicalization of statistics, they make use of a (partial)
equivalence between (degenerate) Bell measurements and
local measurements: Bell measurements can be replaced
by Z measurement in the |0〉, |1〉 basis and byX measure-
ment in the |0¯〉, |1¯〉 basis. Here, a Bell measurement is
one in the Bell basis |Φ±〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉A|0〉B±|1〉A|1〉B)
and |Ψ±〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉A|1〉B ± |1〉A|0〉B), where A and
B denote two users, Alice and Bob, respectively. |0¯〉 =
(1/
√
2)(|0〉 + |1〉) and |1¯〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉 − |1〉). (The Y
measurment is the one in the basis |0˜〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉 +
i|1〉) and |1˜〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉 − i|1〉).) However, the discus-
sion on the equivalence is not clear as we will see. On
the other hand, the security considered so far has been
that from Eve’s (eveasdropper’s) point of view. However,
what we eventually need is a security criterion for Alice
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and Bob, the users.
The purpose of this paper is to give a clearer presen-
tation for the equivalence between the Bell and the local
measurements in the modified LC protocol. While dis-
cussing security criteria for Alice and Bob, we show that
Eve’s refined information on the final state is not helpful
to her. Then, we clarify the equivalence between Bell
measurements and Z and X measurements.
This paper is organized as follows: First, we reformu-
late the modified LC protocol and arguments for its se-
curity in an explicit manner. Next, briefly discussing
security criteria for Alice and Bob, we show that Eve’s
refined information on the final state is not helpful to her.
Then, we argue that the current discussions on the equiv-
alence of the Bell and local measurements are not clear,
and we show that the problem of the equivalence can be
resolved using the fact that Eve’s refined information is
not helpful to her.
II. MODIFIED LO-CHAU PROTOCOL
The legitimate states in the modified LC protocol are
pairs of a Bell state, |Φ+〉. However, the whole quantum
state that Alice, Bob, and Eve share, after distribution of
quantum bits (qubits) and before entanglement distilla-
tion, is an arbitrary state |ψABE〉 that Eve chooses. Let
us write down the state |ψABE〉 in the Bell basis:
|ψABE〉 =
∑
{k}
C{k}σk1(1)σk2(2) · · ·σk2n(2n)|Φ+〉⊗2n|E{k}〉.
(1)
Here, {k} is an abbreviation for k1, k2, ..., k2n with ki =
0, 1, 2, 3 (i = 1, 2, ..., 2n), and σ0 = I, σ1 = X , σ2 =
Y , σ3 = Z are Pauli operators. The σki(i) denotes the
Pauli operator σki acting on ith qubit of Bob. Namely,
σki(i) is I ⊗ σki acting on ith qubit pairs that are shared
by Alice and Bob. Note that the set of σk1(1)σk2(2) · · ·
σk2n(2n)|Φ+〉⊗2n of all {k} constitutes the complete Bell
basis for the 2n qubit pairs. The C{k}’s are coefficients
in complex numbers. Eve’s states |E{k}〉 are normalized,
but not mutually orthogonal in general. It is notable
that the state in Eq. (1) is completely general; thus, it
is dealing with all attacks including opaque (intercept-
2resend), individual, collective, and joint attacks [8].
Let us describe the checking method. Consider a mea-
surement MZ whose projection operators are
P0 = |Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ |Φ−〉〈Φ−| = |00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|,
P1 = |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|+ |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| = |01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|.(2)
Also, consider a measurement MX whose projection op-
erators are
P¯0 = |Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| = |0¯0¯〉〈0¯0¯|+ |1¯1¯〉〈1¯1¯|,
P¯1 = |Φ−〉〈Φ−|+ |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| = |0¯1¯〉〈0¯1¯|+ |1¯0¯〉〈1¯0¯|.(3)
The measurements MZ and MX are nonlocal. (For ex-
ample, P¯0|00〉 = (1/
√
2)P¯0(|Φ+〉 + |Φ−〉) = (1/
√
2)|Φ+〉;
that is, a separable state |00〉 is transformed to a nonlocal
state |Φ+〉.) Thus, obviously they cannot be performed
by Alice and Bob who are supposedly separated. How-
ever, we assume that they can perform the measurements
MZ and MX for the time being. We will see later how
MZ andMX can be replaced by separable measurements
Z and X .
The error rate in the modified LC protocol is defined
as follows: First Alice and Bob randomly choose n pairs
of qubits from among the 2n pairs. On each of the n cho-
sen pairs, they perform a measurement randomly chosen
between MZ and MX . The error rate e is the number of
all instances when the measurement outcomes are those
corresponding to P1 and P¯1 divided by the number of
samples n. From Eqs. (2) and (3), we can see that the
legitimate state |Φ+〉 has zero probability to give rise to
an error, and that other illegitimate states, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉,
and |Ψ−〉, have non-zero probabilities, 1/2, 1/2, and 1,
respectively, to give rise to an error.
Let us now describe the ‘classicalization of statistics’
[5, 6]. We consider a case n = 2, which is simple but il-
lustrative enough. Assume that Alice and Bob’s random
choice was to measure the first and the third pairs in the
Z and the X bases, respectively. That is, they perform a
measurement MZ ⊗ I ⊗ MX ⊗ I on a state |ψ′ABE〉 =∑
{k} C{k}σk1(1)σk2(2)σk3(3)σk4(4)|Φ+〉⊗4|E{k}〉. It is
easy to see that, for example, the probability p00
that they get 0 in the MZ measurement and
0 in the MX measurement is given by p00 =∑
k1=0,3,k2,k3=0,1,k4
|C{k}|2, where k2, k4 = 0, 1, 2, 3.
The resultant state is |ψ′00〉 = N
∑
k1=0,3,k2,k3=0,1,k4
C{k}σk1(1)σk2(2)σk3(3)σk4(4)|Φ+〉⊗4|E{k}〉, where N =
1/
∑
k1=0,3,k2,k3=0,1,k4
|C{k}|2 is the normalization con-
stant. (Note Eqs. (2) and (3) and that (I ⊗ σ3)|Φ+〉 =
|Φ−〉 and (I ⊗ σ1)|Φ+〉 = |Ψ+〉.) In the same way, we
can calculate the probabilities p01, p10, and p11 and
the corresponding resultant states. Then, let us con-
sider a case where Eve prepares a mixed state ρ′ =∑
{k} P{k}σk1(1)σk2(2)σk3(3)σk4(4)|Φ+〉⊗4
〈Φ+|⊗4σk1(1)σk2(2)σk3(3)σk4(4), where P{k} ≡ |C{k}|2.
We consider the case where Alice and Bob perform
the same checking measurement MZ ⊗ I ⊗ MX ⊗ I
on the state ρ′. Then, it is easy to see that, for
example, the probability q00 that they get 0 in the
MZ measurement and 0 in the MX measurement is
the same as the p00 given above. However, the re-
sultant state is not the same, but is given by ρ′00 =
N
∑
k1=0,3,k2,k3=0,1,k4
P{k}σk1(1)σk2(2)σk3(3)σk4(4)|Φ+〉⊗4
〈Φ+|⊗4σk1(1)σk2(2)σk3(3)σk4(4). Note a similarity between
the states |ψ′00〉 and ρ′00. The difference is that the for-
mer is full superpositions that are partially broken in the
latter. In both cases, the only states that are compatible
with the measurement outcomes remain with the relative
magnitude of C{k}’s and P{k}’s preserved. In the same
way, we can calculate p′01, p
′
10, and p
′
11 that also turn out
to be the same as p01, p10, and p11, respectively, and we
obtain the corresponding resultant states. It is straight-
forward to generalize the calculations to the general n
case. If the similarity in the resultant states is used, it is
not difficult to see the classicalization of statistics [5, 6]:
For each state |ψABE〉 in Eq. (1), there exists a corre-
sponding state
ρ =
∑
{k}
P{k} σk1(1)σk2(2) · · · σk2n(2n)|Φ+〉⊗2n
〈Φ+|⊗2nσk1(1)σk2(2) · · · σk2n(2n) (4)
that has the following properties: First, the state gives
rise to the same statistics for the checking measurement
and, thus, has the same probability to pass the test as
those of the state |ψABE〉. Second, when it passes the
test, the resultant states give rise to, after the EDP, a
state that has the same fidelity as the legitimate states,
as in the case of the state |ψABE〉. It is the fidelity of
the final state S(ρAB) to the legitimate state that bounds
Eve’s information on the final key, as seen below. Thus as
far as the security is concerned, the two states in Eqs. (1)
and (4) are equivalent. The classicalization of statistics
plays a crucial role in showing the security in that it
removes some entanglement in the state of Eq. (1) that
is otherwise intractable for Alice and Bob.
Now let us see how the fidelity of the final state of Alice
and Bob to the legitimate state bounds Eve’s information
on the final key [5, 6]. Eve knows the initial state that
she prepared, and she knows the identities of all quan-
tum processing that has been done on the initial state,
including identities and outcomes of measurements, and
a chosen QECC because they are publicly announced.
Therefore, Eve can calculate the final (pure) state ρABE
that Alice, Bob, and herself share. Alice and Bob’s state
ρAB and Eve’s state ρE are given by ρAB = trE(ρABE)
and ρE = trAB(ρABE), respectively. Eve’s von Neumann
entropy S(ρE) = −tr(ρE log ρE) is the same as Alice and
Bob’s S(ρAB) because ρABE is a pure state. On the other
hand, it can be observed [5, 6] that the mutual infor-
mation between Eve’s party and Alice and Bob’s party,
I(AB;E), is bounded by Holevo’s theorem [11]
I(AB;E) ≤ S(ρE) = S(ρAB). (5)
However, S(ρAB) is bounded by the fidelity of the state
ρAB to the legitimate state [5, 6].
3Let us discuss the arguments for security of the modi-
fied LC protocol. Assume that Eve distributed the state
in Eq. (1) to Alice and Bob. Due to the classicalization
of statistics, however, it is sufficient for them to consider
a corresponding case where Eve distributed the state in
Eq. (4). Thus, first we may well separately consider each
term
σk1(1) σk2(2) · · · σk2n(2n)|Φ+〉⊗2n
〈Φ+|⊗2nσk1(1)σk2(2) · · · σk2n(2n) (6)
with a particular {k} and then combine them later. Con-
sider the checking measurement where n randomly cho-
sen pairs are measured along randomly chosen bases. We
can see that the error rate e is statistically proportional
to the ratio of the illegitimate states among the n checked
pairs. Alice and Bob abort the protocol if the measured
error rate e is larger than a threshold for checking, echeck.
The threshold for checking, echeck, is set to be a little bit
smaller than a threshold for error correction ecor., to com-
pensate for statistical fluctuations. Let us assume that
the number of illegitimate states in the state in Eq. (6) is
larger than (2n)(2ecor.). Since the probability that each
illegitimate state is detected in the checking procedure is
equal to or larger than 1/2, as seen above, it typically
give rise to an error rate larger than ecor. for the checked
pairs. Then, the probability that the state passes the
test is negligibly small. In other words, the checking pro-
cedure sifts out, with high probability, any state that
contains more than 4necor. pairs of illegitimate states.
Combining this fact with Bayes’s theorem, we get the
following: Whatever state in Eq. (4) Eve has prepared,
if the state passes the test with a non-negligible proba-
bility, then the ratio of illegitimate states of the resultant
state is less than 2ecor. with high probability. Therefore,
if they choose a QECC that can correct up to an error
rate 2ecor., the final state after quantum error correction
by using the chosen code will have a high fidelity to the
legitimate state.
III. SECURITY CRITERION AND EVE’S
REFINED INFORMATION
Let us now discuss the security criterion. What has
been considered so far is Eve’s viewpoint: The higher
the probability to pass the test by Alice and Bob, the
less the information that Eve gets is. However, what
we actually need is the security criterion for Alice and
Bob, the users. It is intuitively clear that the security
criterion for Eve can be translated to that for Alice and
Bob. However, there remain a few difficulties in doing
so because Alice and Bob do not know the initial state
that Eve knows. Eve’s most general strategy is to pre-
pare a state in Eq. (4) with a probability distribution
P{k}’s. Once Alice and Bob know the probability distri-
bution P{k}’s, combined with the Bayes’s theorem, they
can calculate the final state. However, the problem is
that it is not clear what probability distribution P{k}’s
Eve will choose. However, we can say that Eve will op-
timize her strategy. That is, she will choose an attack
that maximizes her information on the key among those
with the same probability to pass the test. Identification
of the optimal probability distribution P{k}’s seems to
be at heart of the open problem, to find a clear security
criterion for Alice and Bob [6].
However, a certain probability distribution P{k}’s has
been tacitly assumed in discussions on QKD so far. For
example, let us consider the case where Eve chooses an
attack that can give her full information on the key once
it pass the test, but the probability to pass the test is
negligible. That is, she chooses that P{k} 6= 0 for only
those {k}’s in which most of ki are nonzero. If Alice and
Bob assume that Eve adopts this strategy, combined with
the Bayes’s theorem, their conclusion is always that Eve
has full information. However, this is not regarded as a
strategy that Eve will actually adopt because it blocks
communication between Alice and Bob. Here we accept
that it is not a good strategy for Eve. Here, we do not
try to get a rigorous security criterion. It may be a very
subtle problem to find Eve’s optimal strategy because it
may depend on the real situations in which Alice, Bob,
and Eve find themselves. However, it is reasonable to
say that Eve’s optimal strategy is such that Alice and
Bob get a state ρAB that is almost a legitimate state as
a result of the EDP, as assumed so far.
The situation we meet here is that Alice and Bob have
only partial information on the state for which Eve has
full information. That is, we have
ρAB =
∑
i
pitrE(ρ
i
ABE) ≡
∑
i
piρ
i
AB. (7)
Here, ρiABE denotes a (pure) state inferred from
Eve’s classical information i. Consider a case where
F (ρAB, |Φ〉⊗k) ≥ 1 − ǫ with F denoting the fidelity [11]
and ǫ being a positive real number. Let us see how Eve’s
refined knowledge on the state is not so helpful to her by
using the following two arguments.
Let us give the first argument. For each ρiABE , Eve’s
state is given by ρiE = trAB(ρ
i
ABE), and S(ρ
i
E) = S(ρ
i
AB)
because ρiABE is a pure state. Then, the mutual infor-
mation between Eve’s party and Alice and Bob’s party,
Ii(AB;E), is bounded by the S(ρiAB). However, we can
see that
1− ǫ ≤ F (ρAB, |Φ〉⊗k) =
∑
i
piF (ρ
i
AB, |Φ〉⊗k) (8)
by using Eq. (7) and the relation F (
∑
i piρ
i, |ψ〉) =∑
i piF (ρ
i, |ψ〉). Equation (8) says that the average of
the fidelities of ρiAB is bounded by a quantity 1− ǫ that
bounds the fidelity of the average (mixed) state ρAB.
Here, Eve cannot control the outcome of the classical
information i. Thus, it is a meaningful average even
if Eve knows the i. More concretely, let us consider a
particular F (ρiAB, |Φ〉⊗k). From Eq. (8), we have that
4{1− F (ρiAB, |Φ〉⊗k)}pi ≥ ǫ, which expresses a reciprocal
relation between the closeness of the state to legitimate
states and a probability that it happens.
Let us give the second argument. Consider a purifica-
tion of the state ρAB
|ψABE〉 =
∑
i
√
pi|i〉|ψiABE〉 (9)
that is compatible with Eq. (7). Here, |ψiABE〉〈ψiABE | =
ρiABE , and the qubits storing the classical information i
are at Eve’s hands. If Eve first performs a measurement
on qubits storing the i, then the state reduces to ρiABE
with probability pi. The situation now is equivalent to
the case above where Eve has the state ρiABE with knowl-
edge of the i. However, in this case the bound in Eq. (5)
is valid for the pure state |ψABE〉. Therefore, we can say
that the bound in Eq. (5) applies to the case where Eve
has more refined information i about the final state.
IV. EQUIVALENCE OF THE BELL AND THE
LOCAL MEASUREMENTS
Now let us discuss the problem of partial equivalence.
So far, we have assumed that Alice and Bob can per-
form MZ and MX . However, they are nonlocal mea-
surements that cannot be actually done by Alice and
Bob, as seen above. Their argument for this problem
is the following [4, 5, 6, 7]: Let us consider the actual
situation where Alice and Bob each perform Z measure-
ments on a pair of qubits. The basis for this measure-
ment is |00〉, |01〉, |10〉, and |11〉. By Eq. (2), however,
we can estimate the probabilities involved with the MZ
measurement solely from the outcomes of the Z mea-
surement: For example, tr{ρ(|Φ+〉〈Φ+| + |Φ−〉〈Φ−|)} =
tr{ρ(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|)} = tr(ρ|00〉〈00|) + tr(ρ|11〉〈11|).
The same thing can be said for the MX and the X mea-
surements. However, the measured (or checked) n pairs
are not further used by Alice and Bob. Only the re-
maining n information pairs are used for key generation.
That is, the checked and the information pairs are differ-
ent. Therefore, the density operator for the information
pairs is invariant to whatever measurement they do on
the checked pairs, provided that they do not make use of
the information on their measurements outcomes. (One’s
quantum state can depend on his/her knowledge about
the measurement outcomes on the other side when the
shared initial state is entangled, as is well known.) Alice
and Bob may not make use of the information on the
measurement outcomes. Therefore, if the error rate eL
estimated by the local measurements Z and X is below
the threshold for checking echeck,the EDP will be success-
ful with high probability: The fact that eL is less than
echeck implies that if they had estimated the error rate eB
by performing the nonlocal measurement MZ and MX ,
then they also would have found that eB was less than
echeck with high probability. However, as we have seen
above, if eB is less than echeck, then the EDP is successful
with high probability.
However, the measurement outcomes are publicly an-
nounced in the protocol; thus, Eve knows it. The problem
is that Eve can make use of the information on the mea-
surement outcomes. Our solution to this problem is the
following: The best thing that Eve can get is the refined
knowledge on the final state, however, and we have seen
above that such refined information is not so helpful to
Eve. Therefore, now we can safely say that the local Z
and X measurements are equivalent to the nonlocal MZ
and MX measurements as far as the security of BB84
protocol is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
To summarize, we reformulated the modified LC pro-
tocol and arguments for its security in an explicit man-
ner. While discussing the security criterion for Alice and
Bob briefly, we showed that Eve’s refined information on
the final state is not helpful to her. Then, we argued that
current discussions on the equivalence of the Bell and the
local measurements are not clear, and we showed that the
problem of the equivalence can be resolved using the fact
that Eve’s refined information is not helpful to her.
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